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THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LocH-
NER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE. By Howard Gillman. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 317. $34.95. 
The by now almost mythical Supreme Court decision in Lochner v. 
New York 1 has long been the centerpiece of a series of debates over the 
evils of judicial activism, the abuse of judicial power, and the legiti-
macy of substantive due process - debates that are still very much 
alive today.2 Lochner's symbolic significance has greatly transcended 
whatever historical impact may have followed from the Court's deci-
sion to strike down a New York law that limited bakers' working 
hours to sixty hours a week and ten hours a day.3 The Lochner era has 
come to represent a period in our constitutional history from roughly 
1880 to 1937 when conservative Justices aggressively exceeded the 
proper boundaries of their authority to interfere with the political 
process.4 
Many of those who have decried the abuses of this period have 
taken the position articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 
famous Lochner dissent: that the majority decided the case "upon an 
economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain" 
and that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer's Social Statics."5 These critics have portrayed the Justices in 
the Lochner majority as being motivated by their own policy prefer-
ences favoring laissez-faire economics and social Darwinism. 6 By 
1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
2. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987) ("The spec· 
tre of Lachner has loomed over most important constitutional decisions, whether they uphold or 
invalidate governmental practices."). 
3. Although commentators generally agree that the Lachner era continued at least until 
1937, when the Supreme Court drastically altered its approach to minimum-wage legislation in 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the specific holding in Lachner was at least 
implicitly overruled 20 years earlier in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding a 
general law setting maximum work hours). For a detailed account of the factual background of 
the Lachner litigation, conditions in New York City's baking industry, and passage of the New 
York Bakeshop Act of 1895, see PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM PoLmCS: THE 
ANATOMY OF LOCHNER Y. NEW YORK (1990). 
4. See, e.g., ROBERT H. Boru::, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 44 (1990) (stating that Lachner 
is "the symbol, indeed the quintessence, of judicial usurpation of power"); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14 (1980) (stating that the Lachner cases "are now universally 
acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper''); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternal-
ism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & 
HISf. REv. 249, 250 (1987) (stating that Lachner "is still shorthand in constitutional law for the 
worst sins of subjective judicial activism"). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 128 (1985) (defending the Lachner opinion). 
5. Lachner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
6. See, e.g., CARL B. SWISHER, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 520-22 
(1943). For a recent statement to this effect, see FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND NONSENSE 95 (1986) (stating that the "Justices of 
1438 
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reading a guarantee of liberty of contract into the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the critics continue, the Lochner 
Court fraudulently interpreted the Constitution so as to protect the 
interests of private property and to provide cover for its own act of 
judicial legislation, as the Court substituted its policy preferences for 
those of the legislature. Countering this neo-Holmesian interpretation 
of the Lochner era, however, more recent scholars have proposed a 
more complex picture of the underlying ideology motivating the Jus-
tices during this part of our nation's history.7 
In The Constitution Besieged, Howard Gillman8 builds on this still-
developing revisionist interpretation of the period to suggest an alter-
native image of Lochner-era jurisprudence. Gillman's account is 
more historically grounded and more faithful to the jurisprudential 
language employed by the state and federal courts of the time than 
either the traditional or the early revisionist accounts. Instead of ex-
plaining the Lochner era in terms of personal policy preferences, Gill-
man argues that the decisions and opinions of this period represented a 
"serious, principled effort" (p. 10) to maintain the coherence and in-
tegrity of a long-standing constitutional ideology that distinguished 
between valid economic regulation and invalid "class," or factional, 
legislation (pp. 10-11). Gillman premises his approach on the belief 
that judicial opinions are not masks of empty rhetoric and that the 
constitutional jurisprudence of this period- and legal ideology gener-
ally --offers a coherent means of explaining judicial behavior (pp. 15-
18). The author attempts to demonstrate how federal and state judges 
shared a common method of evaluating state legislatures' exercise of 
police powers based on an understanding of political legitimacy and 
equality having its roots in the creation of the Constitution. 
The Justices of the Lochner Court, Gillman contends, brought 
about a crisis in American constitutionalism by stubbornly adhering to 
this constitutional ideology - which was hyperantagonistic toward 
"class" politics and legislation - despite the rapid industrialization 
and transformation of American capitalist relations in this period. 
While legislatures were attempting to extend unprecedented protec-
tions to those groups that had become vulnerable to the coercive forces 
inherent in these new capitalist forms of production, the Supreme 
Court was struggling to maintain an increasingly anachronistic consti-
tutional ideology. In essence, Gillman suggests that the Justices sim-
the [Lochner Court], steeped in the economics of Adam Smith and the sociology of Herbert 
Spencer, unabashedly read their philosophy into the Constitution"). 
7. See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Busi-
ness Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 
970, 973 (1975) (arguing that Justice Field derived his jurisprudence not so much from social 
Darwinism as from the Jacksonian antislavery precept that an individual is free to pursue the 
fruits of her labor as she sees fit). 
8. Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California. 
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ply failed to perceive or acknowledge that profound changes in 
American society had fatally undermined the theoretical underpin-
nings of their police powers jurisprudence. 
Although Gillman offers The Constitution Besieged as a compre-
hensive account of the constitutional crisis that took place during the 
Lochner era, the author's greatest contribution to the reinterpretation 
of this period lies in his detailed account of the development of police 
powers jurisprudence in state courts prior to the Lochner decision in 
1905 and the manner in which the language and reasoning of the 
Supreme Court opinions prior to and following Lochner reflect this 
development. In his effort to present "evidence of the late-nineteenth-
century legal community's obsession with drawing distinctions be-
tween legitimate promotions of the public interest and illegitimate ef-
forts to impose special burdens and benefits" (p. 9), however, Gillman 
only rarely acknowledges that judges in this period did in fact believe 
in something they called "liberty of contract" (p. 6). Nevertheless, 
even though Gillman may be trying to prove too much, his history of 
American police powers jurisprudence skillfully highlights the doc-
trine's antagonism to "class" or "partial" legislation and correspond-
ing emphasis on equal rights and the need for police regulations to 
provide general benefits. 
Gillman's portrayal of the Lochner era is probably best under-
stood, not as a complete refutation of the laissez-faire, liberty-of-con-
tract model of the period, but rather as a deepening and broadening of 
our understanding of these terms by placing them in their particular 
American historical context. 9 After all, the key for any student of this 
period is not merely to reject or attach labels like laissez-faire or liberty 
of contract to judicial ideology but to understand why the courts at 
times upheld, and at other times struck down, legislation that inter-
fered with the free market. To this end, Gillman's contextual ap-
proach has much to add to our understanding of Lochner-era 
constitutional jurisprudence. 
Gillman begins his account by looking at the events and conditions 
surrounding the framing of the U.S. Constitution. He points to the 
familiar concern of the dominant social classes to prevent "factions" 
from gaining political control. Specifically, Gillman highlights the 
Framers' attempts to delegitimize certain kinds of "partial" laws 
passed by state legislatures in the 1780s to advance, the Framers sug-
gested, purely "private" interests, such as debtor-relief legislation and 
wage and price controls, which only benefited a narrow segment or 
class of society (pp. 26-33). The Framers sought to delegitimize these 
9. P. 189 ("Still, 'liberty of contract' had come to represent the Court's general attitude that 
market relationships should be free from government interference unless the legislature was pro-
moting an acceptable public purpose ..•. "); p. 114 ("Market freedom, or 'liberty of contract,' 
was linked inextricably with the commitment to faction-free legislation."). 
May 1994] Courts and Constitutions 1441 
partial laws by stressing the need for government to remain neutral in 
the conflicts arising between social groups or classes competing in the 
economy (p. 32). Government neutrality, Gillman contends, followed 
from the Framers' underlying belief that "the market was essentially 
harmonious and liberty loving" (p. 21). Moreover, Gillman suggests 
that when the Framers first elaborated their principle of equality and 
governmental impartiality in the 1780s, "its legitimacy rested specifi-
cally on the assumption that a commercial republic would not create 
conditions of social dependency that could be used by vulnerable 
groups to justify requests for special government protection and assist-
ance" (p. 21). 
At the center of republican ideology stood the image of the self-
reliant or autonomous individual. Although he notes differences be-
tween groups such as the Liberal Whigs and the Philadelphian arti-
sans, Gillman stresses that the dominant vision of Thomas Jefferson 
and his followers held that America's expansive frontier would ensure 
this individual self-reliance and allow the government to remain 
"class-neutral" (p. 26). Gillman also indicates that he recognizes that 
this period's faith in the "natural society" was far from neutral in its 
long-term effects.10 Yet he insists that those who opposed any inter-
ference with the common law obligations imposed on competing par-
ties in the market economy predicated their sensibility on "the 
assumption that the social relations constructed by the common-law 
regime of contract and property were essentially fair and liberty loving 
- or at least would be in the United States, with its expansive fron-
tier."11 As Gillman acknowledges, however, despite the Framers' vi-
sion of social relations grounded in fairness and liberty, the 
"Constitution set up a political structure specifically designed to nur-
ture and protect the social relations produced by capitalism by 
preventing the state from taking sides in the disputes arising among or 
between competing classes" (p. 33). 
Unfortunately, Gillman never adequately follows up on the free-
market implications of these statements or their affinity with views ex-
pressed by other commentators that the Lochner-era Justices' reliance 
on the common law and affi.rmance of the status quo was in effect a 
form of laissez-faire constitutionalism.12 In tracing the transformation 
of the founders' ideology into constitutional police powers jurispru-
10. Pp. 26-27 ("The common law established a set of class identities and class interests 
linked to the ownership of different types of property (slaves, land, capital, the tools of one's 
trade, commodities) and the enjoyment of the rights and privileges associated with such 
ownership."). 
11. P. 27. In other words, common law obligations, such as rights of contract and debtor-
creditor laws, were considered just and natural even when enforced against certain groups in 
society because it was presumed that America's abundance would not result in any class suffering 
under conditions of dependency for long. 
12. For a discussion along these lines, see Sunstein, supra note 2, at 876-83, 903 (suggesting 
that the Lochner-era approach was a failure precisely because the "Lochner Court chose the 
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dence during the period of Jacksonian democracy, Gillman chooses to 
ignore almost completely the judicial commitment to market liberty in 
order to focus more narrowly on the extent to which state courts de-
veloped the founders' aversion to factional and class-based politics. 
Curiously, having recognized that these two commitments are really 
two sides of the same coin, Gillman apparently felt it necessary to 
redress some perceived imbalance in the current scholarship by mini-
mizing or ignoring any free market implications in his account of the 
history of police powers jurisprudence, to the point of largely omitting 
the expression laissez-faire itself from his discussion. 
Gillman does, however, provide a partial definition of the Jackso-
nian ideology of "market freedom" when he stresses this political coa-
lition's commitment to political equality and the removal of 
monopolies and chartered, or artificial, economic privileges (pp. 34-
41). Gillman's focus, as always, is on how the judges understood and 
rationalized the choices they were making. The judges who adhered, 
however loosely, to Jacksonian ideology believed that governments 
should be limited to making laws of a general character - uniform 
and universal in their operation. Government action ought not favor 
one class over the other - for example, the farmer over the mechanic, 
or the manufacturer over both (p. 38). Although early Supreme Court 
scrutiny of the behavior of state legislatures rested uneasily on the no-
tion of vested rights and the narrow protection of private property,13 
Gillman contends that by the midnineteenth century, courts more fre-
quently defined the boundaries of the police powers by emphasizing 
"the illegitimacy of so-called unequal, partial, class, or special legisla-
tion; that is, legislation which advanced the interests of only a part of 
the community."14 With the barrier of vested rights eroding and the 
greater acceptance in law of Jacksonian politics aimed at releasing 
market energies, Gillman suggests, courts had begun to demand that 
legislation be justified on the grounds that it contributed to the general 
welfare (pp. 48-49). 
As an example, Gillman cites the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
decision in Vandine's Case, 15 in which the court upheld a Boston by-
law that prohibited all persons, except those with licenses, from re-
moving "any house-dirt, refuse, offal, filth or animal or vegetable 
status quo, as reflected in market ordering under the common law system, as the baseline for 
measurement of departures from neutrality and of action and inaction"). 
13. See Calderv. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("[A] law that takes property from A. 
and gives it to B .... is against all reason and justice •••. "). 
14. P. 49. Gillman suggests that the "Jacksonian conception of classlessness and commercial 
development was largely a reaction to the assumptions that drove Marshall's jurisprudence." P. 
47. As an example of Justice Marshall's jurisprudence, Gillman offers Marshall's opinion in 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), which protected 
established charters of incorporation from legislative interference. 
15. 23 Mass. (6 Pick) 187 (1828). 
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substance from any of the dwellinghouses or other places occupied by 
the inhabitants."16 The court agreed that the proper test in determin-
ing the validity of this ordinance was whether this restraint of trade 
"reasonably" advanced the general welfare, that is, whether it was 
"necessary for the good government of the society" (p. 51). In making 
this determination the court looked to both the object and the neces-
sity of the bylaw. Gillman suggests that the court's concern was not 
the extent to which the bylaw impaired market freedom but rather 
whether it advanced the "general welfare of the community" and not 
the "particular welfare of private interests" (pp. 51-52). 
Similarly, in Bank of the State v. Cooper, 17 the Tennessee Supreme 
Court invalidated an act that created a special court to handle all law-
suits brought against the Bank of the State of Tennessee. The court 
stressed that the "law of the land" meant a general public law and that 
this provision was intended to restrain the legislature from enacting any 
law affecting injuriously the rights of any citizen, unless at the same time 
the rights of all others in similar circumstances were equally affected by 
it. If the law be general in its operation, affecting all alike, the minority 
are safe .... 18 
Gillman contends that cases such as these contributed to the develop-
ment in the nineteenth century of a constitutional jurisprudence "or-
ganized around the core value of equality under the law" and the 
requirement that legislatures qemonstrate a legitimate "public pur-
pose." 19 As a limit on government, Gillman argues, public purpose 
did not mean laissez-faire; instead it meant class-neutral legislation 
that did not impose special burdens or benefits on market competitors. 
Gillman points out that judges in this period upheld inspection and 
public health laws, location restrictions for certain dangerous or un-
healthy businesses, regulations of weights and measures, licensing 
schemes, and prohibition acts (p. 55). He contends that the issue for 
judges faced with a regulation was whether it was arguably neutral 
with regard to the various interests or groups competing in society. 
Thomas M. Cooley, Gillman suggests, was perhaps the most familiar, 
and most misunderstood, exponent of the conception of political legiti-
macy that underlies this standard of legal review (pp. 55-56). Though 
Cooley was a proponent of market liberty and the protection of con-
tract and property rights, his treatise on constitutional limitations rec-
16. 23 Mass. (6 Pick) at 187-92. 
17. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 529 (1831). 
18. 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 535-36. In striking down the law, the court wrote, "This law only 
acts upon individual cases, and is the same in principle as if a law had been passed in favor of 
some one merchant, enabling him, by the method therein prescribed, to take judgment against 
his debtors without the right of appeal." 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 536. 
19. Pp. 54-56; see also Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 465 (1871) (reflecting on 
"that principle of constitutional law which prohibits unequal and partial legislation upon general 
subjects"). 
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ognized that property rights are " 'subject to those general regulations 
which are necessary to the common good and general welfare' "20 and 
that the " 'dimensions of the government's police power are identical 
with the dimensions of the government's duty to protect and promote 
the public welfare.' "21 
With the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, federal courts for 
the first time began to scrutinize the day-to-day legislation that state 
judges had been ruling on prior to the Civil War. Gillman argues con-
vincingly that the Supreme Court consistently drew upon the stan-
dards developed by the state courts when it attempted to elaborate on 
the limits of police powers legislation under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment (pp. 62-75). In doing so, he looks to the language employed by 
the Court in opinions such as the Slaughter-house Cases 22 and Loan 
Assn. v. City ofTopeka. 23 Gillman contends that the Court's insistence 
that laws be "reasonable" and its antagonism toward legislation identi-
fied as "arbitrary," meaning factional, together indicate the Court's 
adoption of a police powers jurisprudence that approved of class-neu-
tral policies that advanced a public purpose (pp. 72-73, 104-31). 
Gillman next presents an effective if brief survey of the history of 
industrialization and the social and economic revolution that took 
place in the latter half of the nineteenth century (pp. 76-86). He dis-
cusses how the rise of trade union activity and the proliferation of 
collective action raised the specter of factional or class politics for 
courts still captured by an ideology focusing on the general welfare 
and insisting on government neutrality with respect to private inter-
ests. State courts responded to the increase in labor legislation by 
steadfastly insisting that it have some relationship to a public purpose 
(pp. 86-99). Here, however, the author's discussion does not go far 
enough. Although Gillman may be correct that state courts in this 
period were motivated more by their aversion to what they believed 
20. 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REsT UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 1224 (8th ed. 
1927) (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851)); seep. 57. 
21. 2 CoOLEY, supra note 20, at 1226 (quoting Leonard v. State, 127 N.E. 464, 465 (Ohio 
1919)); seep. 57. 
22. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Gillman compares the language of the majority opinion, 
which upheld a state-created slaughterhouse monopoly as consistent with the state's police power 
to protect the health of the citizenry, see 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 62-66, with the language of the 
dissenting Justices, who objected to the monopoly as special privilege legislation. See 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) at 87 (Field, J., dissenting), 120 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see pp. 64-67. 
23. 87 U.S. 655, 659, 664-65 (1874) (invalidating a state law authorizing municipalities to 
issue bonds or lend their credit to aid manufacturing enterprises on the grounds that such enter-
prises were not of a "public character" but were only "private interest[s]"); see pp. 67-68. Gill-
man also discusses Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888), in which the Court upheld a 
prohibition on the sale of oleomargarine because the prohibition was a good faith effort "to 
protect the public health and to prevent the adulteration of dairy products," 127 U.S. at 683-84, 
and because it applied equally to everyone engaged in the business. 127 U.S. at 687; see pp. 73-
75. 
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was class politics than by any particular adherence to strict laissez-
faire constitutionalism, he does not adequately explain why judges 
continued to maintain an ideology that was becoming so obviously 
anachronistic. Gillman's only suggestion appears to be that they were 
dominated by an "ideological barrier" and that they were "institution-
ally obligated to preserve the dominant vision" (p. 99). 
Gillman suggests that it was only over time and because of the 
onslaught of a "new realism" regarding the conditions and realities of 
American economic life that the Supreme Court began to reevaluate 
its commitment to the tradition of neutrality (pp. 132-93). Until that 
point, Gillman claims, the Court was only willing to uphold protective 
or special legislation because of the particularly dangerous health con-
ditions of a specific group of workers, 24 or because the class of workers 
lacked the capacity to fend for themselves, as for example, young chil-
dren, insane persons, and women. 25 As Gillman puts it, the issue for 
the Court was not whether a labor statute interfered with market free-
dom per se but whether it could be justified as something other than 
class legislation. 26 
The author suggests that precisely this "heightened sense of class 
conflict and careful scrutiny of exercises of the police powers" (p. 125) 
led a majority of the Court to strike down the maximum hours law for 
bakers in Lochner v. New York 27 Gillman takes seriously the debate 
between the majority and the Harlan-led dissenters28 in Lochner as to 
whether the law could be justified on health grounds, suggesting that it 
reflected their commitment to a well-defined police powers jurispru-
dence. In this regard, Gillman contends that Justice Holmes's lone 
dissent was "somewhat beside the point" in that it failed to address the 
central terms of the debate among the other Justices (p. 131). 
Gillman's account offers convincing evidence that the Lochner era 
should not be understood as being dominated by some "ill-defined 
commitment to laissez-faire in the abstract" (p. 174) and that the opin-
ions in this period flowed from "an overarching set of well-established 
legal doctrines and principles governing the legitimate exercise of po-
lice powers" that distinguished between valid health laws and illegiti-
24. See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1897) (upholding a Utah labor law restricting 
miners to an eight-hour day); see p. 125 ("Holden stood for the proposition that the police pow-
ers could be used not only to promote the general well-being of the con;imunity but also the 
specific physical well-being of a class of workers who were not in a position to make contracts 
favorable to their health and safety."). 
25. See pp. 120-21, 137-38. 
26. See pp. 97, 174-75, 199. 
27. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a defense of Lochner on this point, see Richard A. Epstein, Self-
Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL Eouc. 153, 157 (1987), suggesting that "[d]ecisions 
such as Lochner v. New York were correct because New York's maximum-hour legislation was 
vintage special-interest legislation." 
28. Justices White and Day concurred in Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion. 198 U.S. at 65. 
Justice Holmes dissented alone. 198 U.S. at 74. 
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mate class legislation (p. 177). On a theoretical level, however, 
Gillman's treatment of the debate surrounding Lochner is not as so-
phisticated or as subtle as it needs to be. His failure to define exactly 
what he means by "laissez-faire economics" or to pursue the underly-
ing free-market implications of the ideology he traces is particularly 
troublesome. Only occasionally does the reader become aware that 
Gillman is arguing against a rather absolute definition of laissez-faire 
ideology29 that makes no allowances for differences among the Justices 
of the period. 30 This failure is disappointing because Gillman is in fact 
engaging in an important redefinition of Lochner-era laissez-faire con-
stitutionalism, even though he has chosen to posit his account against 
the straw man embodied by the Holmesian paradigm.31 
These theoretical weaknesses should not obscure the important 
contribution that The Constitution Besieged makes to our understand-
ing of the historical development of police powers jurisprudence, in-
cluding its roots in the framing of the Constitution, its refinement in 
the state courts, and its eventual adoption by the Supreme Court after 
the Civil War. Although he does not address the theoretical and ana-
lytic implications of the Lochner era for modem constitutionalism,32 
Gillman does provide a compelling account of the way state judges 
and the Supreme Court.in this period understood and portrayed their 
antagonism to the class legislation that threatened government neu-
trality, and of how the sweep of industrialism and social realism finally 
convinced the Court of just how anachronistic its police powers juris-
prudence had become. 
- C. Ian Anderson 
29. For example, Gillman at one point suggests that the "central distinction" of this period's 
jurisprudence was 
based not on judgments about whether laws burdened free enterprise a lot or a little, but on 
judgments about whether interventions in market relations were related to a historically 
defined conception of the public purpose or instead were better understood as corrupt at-
tempts by particular classes to gain unfair and unnatural advantages over their market 
adversaries. 
P. 193 (emphasis added). 
30. Cf. Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tra-
dition. 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6-23 (1991) (discussing three approaches to Lochner-era substantive 
due process in terms of Justices who were either strict laissez-faire constitutionalists, moderate 
laissez-faire constitutionalists, or liberal constitutionalists). 
31. For example, while some commentators continue to attribute the Lochner decision to the 
influence of social Darwinism, as reflected by laissez-faire economics, see, e.g., KENS, supra note 
3, at 165, others argue today that this view greatly exaggerates the influence of such concepts on 
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due 
Process, 40 STAN. L. REv. 379, 418 (1988) ("There is painfully little evidence that any members 
of the Supreme Court were Social Darwinists, or for that matter even Darwinian."). 
32. For a discussion of Lochner's modem implications, see generally Sunstein, supra note 2. 
